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Summary
Iraq, the United States, and the United Nations are preparing for Iraq’s planned
elections for a transitional National Assembly, scheduled for January 30, 2005.
However, elections preparations are significantly hindered by continuing insurgency and
threats of a boycott by many of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs.  This report will be updated
regularly.  See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-
Saddam Governance.  
Shortly after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime in
April 2003, the Bush Administration made the end of U.S. military occupation contingent
on the completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections, tasks
expected to take two years.  However, major Iraqi factions agitated for an early restoration
of  sovereignty, and the Bush Administration decided to hand sovereignty to an appointed
Iraqi government by June 30, 2004, and to hold elections and write a  constitution
thereafter.  The current  transition roadmap was laid out in a Transitional Administrative
Law (TAL), drafted and signed by Iraqi officials on March 8, 2004.1  Its key points are as
follows:
! A “transition government” is to be formed, chosen by a 275-seat National
Assembly, elected in voting no later than January 31, 2005.  Provincial
assemblies and the Kurdistan regional assembly are to be elected
simultaneously.  The Assembly is to choose a “presidency council” (a
president and two deputy presidents) and a prime minister. 
! The election law for the National Assembly “shall aim to achieve the
goal of having women constitute no less than 25%” of its membership.
! The transition government (post-January 31, 2005) is to draft (by August
15, 2005) a constitution to be put to a national vote by October 15, 2005.
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A highly controversial provision allows two-thirds of the voters in any
three Iraqi provinces to veto the permanent constitution, effectively
giving the Kurds (who control three northern provinces) a veto.  If the
constitution is defeated, a re-draft is to be voted on by October 15, 2006.
! If the permanent constitution is approved, elections for a permanent
government are to occur by December 15, 2005, and it would take office
by December 31, 2005.  If the constitution is not approved, then the
December 15, 2005 elections are to be for a new National Assembly.  
The TAL did not address how an interim (post-handover) government would be
chosen, a key issue because the January 2005 elections will be held while the interim
government is running Iraq.  The United States ceded to U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi
substantial responsibility for selecting the interim government, but  maneuvering by major
Iraqi faction leaders led to the inclusion of many of them — or their political allies — in
the interim government.  Some cabinet seats were given to non-politicians.  The interim
government was selected on June 1, 2004 and began work immediately, but the formal
handover of sovereignty took place in a brief ceremony at about 10:30 A.M. Baghdad
time on June 28, 2004, two days ahead of schedule.
Many of the powers of the interim government are spelled out in U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004).  It endorsed the handover of sovereignty and
granted the United Nations a major role in assisting the Iraqi government in preparing for
the elections.  It  also authorized a force within the coalition to protect U.N. personnel and
facilities.  Resolution 1546, along with an addendum to the TAL, provided for the holding
of a conference of over 1,000 Iraqis to choose a 100-seat advisory council (“Interim
National Council”) which lacks legislative authority but is able to veto decisions by the
executive branch with a two thirds majority.  The conference was held under tight security
on August 13-18, 2004; it selected a council dominated by the major Shiite Islamist,
Kurdish, and other established parties.  It was sworn in on September 1, 2004. 
The Planned January 2005 Elections
U.S. and Iraqi attention is now focused on the  Assembly elections and simultaneous
elections for  governments of Iraq’s 18 provinces, and the Kurdish assembly; election day
is set for January 30, 2005.  In June 2004, the United Nations formed an 8-member
Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), nominated by notables from around
Iraq, to run the election process.  The United Nations, as well as CPA orders 92, 96, and
97 — issued just before the sovereignty handover — provided for voting by proportional
representation (closed list), in which voters choose among competing party/coalition
slates and individuals running as independents.  Seats in the Assembly are to be allocated
in proportion to a party list’s showing in the voting.  Some have criticized the
proportional representation system as unable to accommodate the possibility of delayed
elections in insecure areas of Iraq and likely to favor well-established parties.2  Others say
this system is easiest to administer and maximizes  candidates’ security by eliminating the
need to campaign in individual districts.  Under IECI rules, a woman candidate is to
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occupy roughly every third position on any electoral list in order to meet the goal for
women’s membership in the new Assembly.  Under an Iraqi decision announced on
November 4, 2004, Iraqis abroad — estimated at about 3.5 million — will be allowed to
vote, with voting to be organized by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
U.N.  electoral advisers had opposed that decision because of the complexity and expense
of distributing and collecting ballots abroad.
Registration of voters, parties, and candidates (the latter two categories are “political
entities”) began on November 1, 2004.  According to U.N. elections officials in Iraq, voter
lists are based on  ration card lists containing about 14 million names; voters must be at
least 18 years old.  Each political entity (party or individual) must obtain 500 signatures
from eligible voters and pay about $5,000 to be registered.  The voter and entity
registration process, which involves 550 centers around Iraq co-located with food ration
distribution points, closed on December 15, 2004, although approximately 100 centers in
restive Anbar, Diyala, and Nineveh provinces were not  open during the registration
period.  It is estimated that there will be about 28,000 polling places on election day.
Thus far, 6,000 Iraqis have been hired to staff the registration centers.  U.N. officials
estimate that over 100,000 staff will eventually be needed for the election.
Security and Logistics
A major issue is whether Iraq is secure enough to permit a free and fair election.
Virtually all commentators on the issue, including U.S. officials, say that the  insurgency,
which is particularly strong in several provinces dominated by Sunni Arabs, poses a
challenge to the election.  However, President Bush said in December 2004 that the
elections should proceed on schedule, and U.S. officials, including some that have
sometimes appeared to leave room for a postponement, say the elections will happen on
time.  A regional conference on Iraq, held in Egypt on November 22-23, 2004, endorsed
the holding of elections by that date.  The commitment to the election schedule came
despite a move, on November 26, 2004, by fifteen mainly Sunni Arab Iraqi parties, to
obtain a six-month postponement to allow time to calm the restive areas.  One issue that
has arisen is whether or not there could be a delay in voting only in those areas deemed
insufficiently secure, such as the Sunni Arab-inhabited towns of Fallujah and Ramadi, but
that possibility has apparently been ruled out on the grounds that the Sunni Arabs would
feel disenfranchised and would likely continue to provide support to the insurgency.3  In
December 2004, Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi floated another idea under which voting
might be conducted over a period of a few weeks, a method that presumably would allow
for enhanced voting security, although support for that idea appears to have receded. 
 
In an effort to address the security issues, in September 2004 U.S. forces began
offensives against insurgent-held towns in hopes of restoring security and paving the way
for these towns to vote.  In a major operation in November 2004, U.S. forces largely
ended insurgent control of Fallujah and conducted similar but smaller operations in
Samarra, Mosul, and towns south of Baghdad, although insurgents are still said to be
operating in virtually all of these areas.  U.S. commanders say U.S. force levels in Iraq
have now risen to 150,000 from the prior level of about 140,000, in order to better secure
the election period.
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Security concerns have also affected the ability of the United Nations to assist Iraq’s
election preparations.  Iraqi officials have complained that the 35-person U.N. contingent
now in Iraq — which includes new U.N. envoy to Iraq Ashraf Jahangir Qazi (a Pakistani
U.N. diplomat) but only 19 election specialists — is far too small to prepare for the
elections.  U.S. officials have found some donors to a U.N. protection force provided for
by Resolution 1546, and the United Nations said on December 15 that  it plans to increase
the election specialist component to at least 25.  Fiji is deploying 130 troops and Georgia
has begun to deploy a contingent of 691 troops to the force as well.
Emerging Competition4
The Iraqi groups that have thus far taken the most active interest in the upcoming
elections are primarily those parties best positioned to win seats:  Shiite Islamist parties,
the Kurds, and secular parties that  emerged just prior to or after the overthrow of
Saddam.  These factions apparently believe that free elections offer them an opportunity
to gain a legitimate share of power in post-Saddam Iraq.  It is not known how many voters
are registered to date, although press reports suggest that registration in the Sunni Arab-
inhabited areas of Iraq has been relatively low.  
As of the December 15, 2004 close of registration, 6,400 total “political entities”
have registered, including 100 election “lists.”  Of those 100 lists, 66 lists were put
forward by political parties, 25 were furnished by individual candidates, and nine were
broad multi-party coalition slates.  The most prominent coalition list announced to date
was unveiled on December 8, 2004, brokered by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his
top aides, including former nuclear scientist (and potential prime minister) Hussein
Shahristani.  Sistani himself, who is Iraq’s supreme Shiite leader, is not a candidate.  His
so-called “United Iraqi Alliance” list consists of  22 parties and contains 228 candidates.
In an effort to attract a diverse range of voters, the list includes a smattering of non-
Islamist Shiites, Sunni tribal candidates, and Turkoman and Yazidi ethnic and religious
minority candidates, but it is clearly dominated by two moderate Shiite Islamist parties:
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wa Party.
Both parties, but particularly SCIRI, are considered close to Tehran, and their prominence
has led to allegations by some Iraqis that Iran is meddling in the Iraqi election.  The first
candidate on the United Iraqi Alliance list is SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who
was in exile in Iran during the 1980s-1990s.  Da’wa leader Ibrahim Jafari, currently a Vice
President, is number seven on this slate.  
One candidate on the Sistani list, the tenth position, is secular Shiite Ahmad Chalabi,
a former U.S. ally who fell out with the United States.  He heads the largely secular Iraqi
National Congress (INC) but he has aligned the INC with moderate Shiite Islamists in a
“Shiite Political Council.”  Largely absent from the Sistani list are candidates publicly
aligned with radical young Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose faction did not register
as a political entity and who has said his grouping will not participate in the elections
unless there is a firm date for a U.S. military withdrawal.  In an early indication of
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was assassinated on December 9, 2004. 
 
Other large slates consisting of long-established parties have formed.  The two main
Kurdish parties — the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
— are offering a joint list.  Another list was offered by President Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni
tribal figure who has formed his own “Iraqis’ Party.”  The Communist Party, headed by
former IGC member Hamid al-Musa, has filed a 257-candidate slate.  On the eve of the
filing deadline, Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi filed his own six-party, 240-candidate  slate
(“the Iraqi List”) led by his Iraqi National Accord (INA) party, but which includes tribal
leaders, mostly secular Sunni and Shiite independents, and at least one moderate Shiite
Islamist, Hussein al-Sadr.  Allawi said his slate, should it be victorious, would push for
the “eventual” withdraw of international forces from Iraq. 
Smaller, emerging parties have filed to compete as well.  These parties appear to be
based less on sectarian identity than some of the major parties, and they are generally
secular and pro-Western.  Some of these smaller parties include the National Democratic
Party of Baghdad lawyer Nasser al-Chaderchy, a former IGC member; a four-party
coalition called the National Brotherhood for Liberation and Development, headed by
Baghdad academic Wamidh al-Nadhmi; the “Iraq Coalition Party,”a mostly Sunni Arab
tribal party led by the prominent Jabburi clan; the Iraq National Movement, headed by
former military officer  Hatem al-Mukhlis; and the Iraq Democratic Congress of Jawat
Obeidi. 
Press reports say there is little evident enthusiasm for the elections  among Sunni
Arabs, who apparently believe that their small numbers in Iraq (about 20% of the total
population) means that elections will result in their defeat.  Many observers appear to
agree that a broad boycott or non-participation by Sunni Arabs could threaten the
legitimacy of the elections.  Sunni Arab clerics belonging to an organization called the
Iraq Muslim Clerics’ Association, which is said to be close to the insurgents, called for
a broad Sunni boycott after U.S. forces began their assault on rebel-held Fallujah on
November 8.  A more moderate Islamist Sunni party,  the Iraqi Islamic Party of former
IGC member Muhsin Abd al-Hamid, has registered for the elections with a 275-seat slate,
but it has said it will not decide until the last minute whether to compete.  Another mostly
Sunni party, the Iraqi Independent Democrats, headed by pro-U.S. former diplomat and
former IGC member Adnan Pachachi has filed a slate consisting mostly of professionals.
Pachachi registered his list even though he led the late November effort to bring about a
postponement and he says Sunni Arab turnout might be lower than 10% in restive areas.
In an effort to try to increase Sunni Arab participation, Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi has
held talks in Jordan with Sunni factions, including some believed close to the insurgency.
Election Funding
To  run the elections, the Iraqi government has budgeted about $250 million, of
which $130 million is expected to be offset by international donors, including about $40
million from the European Union.  The Bush Administration is assisting Iraq in the
elections process as well as other election-related functions.  In October  2004, based on
a review of how best to use funds from an $18.6 billion Iraq reconstruction appropriation
(FY2004 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 108-106), the Administration increased
allocations for election-related assistance in Iraq.  According to a State Department fact
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the reconstruction funds on election assistance and related “democracy promotion and
governance” programs — an increase of $180 million from previous allocations.  
Of the $180 million increase: (1) $40 million is to improve the capacity of Iraq’s
election commission that will run the election; (2) $20 million additional (in addition to
$25 million previously allocated) will be for a nationwide elections monitoring program;
(3) $30 million will go to the National Endowment of Democracy to provide technical
assistance for “moderate and democratic” political parties in Iraq; (4) $100 million (in
addition to $134 million previously allocated) will go to support local and provincial
governing institutions around Iraq; and (5)  $20 million (in addition to $21 million already
allocated) will be used to support operations of the Iraqi interim government.  About $40
million previously allocated is being used to fund Iraqi political party development
through the National Endowment of Democracy (NED) and its party-based partners the
National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI).
Remaining funds from the $871 million total are to be used to promote democracy and
civil society, including training emerging Iraq leaders and educating Iraqis on democracy,
human rights, and governance through these same organizations as well as others,
including the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP).
Conclusions
The planned January 30, 2005 elections might provide a major test for U.S. policy.
An electoral process that is significantly postponed, subjected to a boycott by major
segments of the Iraqi population, or  significantly marred or derailed by major insurgent
violence, could lead to a major U.S. review of Iraq policy.  A failed election process could
prompt consideration of other options, such as U.N.-backed power-sharing negotiations
among major factions to form a coalition government, or U.S. backing for indefinite rule
by the existing leadership of Prime Minister Allawi.  Another option could be to support
one major faction, such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his Shiite allies, in the
formation of a new government that might design a new transition plan.  
On the other hand, elections that are considered successful (broad participation,
limited violence, accepted outcome) could become a turning point in Iraq’s transition.
Successful elections could reduce popular support for the insurgency, prompt negotiations
on an end to anti-government violence, and pave the way not only for further political
reconstruction, but also accelerated economic reconstruction.  These developments could
create conditions for reduced U.S. force levels in Iraq.
